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Abstract
The exchange rate is an important part of the transmission mechanism in
the determination of monetary policy because movements in the exchange rate
have signicant e¤ect on the macroeconomy. It can be di¢ cult to measure the
reaction of monetary policy to the movements of the exchange rate, due to the
simultaneous response of monetary policy to the exchange rate and the possibil-
ity that both variables respond to several other variables. This study addresses
these problems by using an identication method based on the heteroscedastic-
ity in the high-frequency data. The results in this paper suggest that the ECB
systematically responds to exchange rate movements but that quantitative ef-
fects are small. Such a signicant but small reaction coe¢ cient seems consistent
with the hypothesis that the central banks do not target the uctuations in the
exchange rate but consider them only to the extent they impact on the expected
ination and output path.
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" ... it is clearly not opportune to introduce asset prices into a monetary
policy rule the central bank should commit to or in the central banks reaction
function." Jean-Claude Trichet (2002)
1. Introduction
There are three main channels through which the exchange rate a¤ects the
macroeconomy. Appreciation lowers real GDP because of expenditure switch-
ing, and further, it lowers ination because the price of imported goods does not
increase as rapidly with the appreciation of the currency (Taylor, 2001). Sec-
ondly, changes in the exchange rate also generate wealth e¤ects that may have
a signicant impact on consumption and investment, both of which are compo-
nents of aggregate demand. Because of householdsinter-temporal smoothing
behaviour, a direct decrease in net wealth may lead to a drop in consump-
tion. Lastly, depreciation can increase the value of collateral which may reduce
agentsexternal nancing constraints and enhance nal spending in accordance
with the "broad credit channel".
Because of these important impacts of the exchange rate on aggregate de-
mand, output and ination, which are components of policy rule, there may
be a relationship between exchange rates and monetary policy rules. The main
objective of this paper is to measure the response of monetary policy to the
exchange rate in the Euro area and try to determine the role of the exchange
rate in monetary policy.
Although the monetary policy response to exchange rates has largely been
studied in the empirical literature, there are some di¢ culties in measuring this
e¤ect. To begin with, while monetary policy is a¤ected by changes in exchange
rate, the exchange rate also responds to the changes in the monetary policy; i.e.
there is a simultaneous response of both variables to each other, so, the direction
of causality is di¢ cult to establish. Moreover, there are other unobservable
common factors a¤ecting both short term interest rates and exchange rates, such
as macroeconomic news and change in the risk preference. Hence, measurement
is complicated due to the endogeneity problem and the possibility of relevant
variables being omitted.
There is considerable empirical literature on the exchange rate in a policy
rule. However, general empirical studies ignore the endogeneity problem and
eliminate numerous factors a¤ecting interest rates and exchange rates. Most
of them use the least square, two stages least square, VAR and IV approaches
to estimate the response of interest rates. But these approaches cannot appro-
priately solve the problems mentioned above. Least square results are strongly
biased; there are no obvious restrictions to identify monetary policy shocks in
the VAR framework; and lastly, it is hard to nd a proper instrument which af-
fects the exchange rate without a¤ecting interest rates. In this study, to address
these problems, we apply a new identication approach developed by Rigobon
(2003a), which argues that the response of monetary policy is based on the het-
eroskedasticity of exchange rate shocks. In particular shift in the importance of
the exchange rate shocks relative to the monetary policy shocks thereby esti-
mated changes in variance-covariance matrix between shocks make measure the
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responsiveness of monetary policy to exchange rate possible. Heteroskedasticity
based identication is a relatively new method and this paper presents the rst
study to employ this approach to measure policy reactions to the exchange rate
movements for ECB data.
The impact of asset prices on the conduct of monetary policy debates has
increased over the last decade. Taylor (2001) argues that a monetary policy
rule that reacts directly to the exchange rate, as well as to ination and output,
sometimes works worse than policy rules that do not react directly to the ex-
change rate. However, Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) argue that monetary
policy should react to asset price movements only to the extent warranted by
their impact on expected ination. On similar lines, Rigobon and Sack (RS)
(2003b) nd that the Federal Reserve reacts signicantly to changes in the stock
market. Their ndings suggest that policy-makers are reacting to asset price
movements to the extent warranted by their implications for the economy. In
the context of discussing the impact of asset prices on monetary policy, Jean-
Claude Trichet, governor of the ECB from 2003 to 2011, stated that nancial
indicators (stock prices, housing prices, exchange rates) are also analyzed in
depth and they are assessed in the context of maintaining price stability over
the medium term: the ECB does not react to their signals unless price stability
is endangered. Conversely, the empirical ndings of this paper indicate that the
ECB responds systematically to the exchange rate movements and the reaction
coe¢ cient is signicantly negative but small. Since the estimated policy reac-
tion coe¢ cient is within reasonable range of the magnitude, it appears that the
ECB reacts to exchange rate uctuations only to o¤set the expected impact of
exchange rate shocks on ination and output.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briey describes the relevant stud-
ies in the literature and the contribution of this paper. Section 3 discusses the
problems of simultaneous equations and omitted variables and demonstrates
why other widely used identication methods are inappropriate in this con-
text. Also, this section describes the identication approach based on the het-
eroskedasticity of exchange rate shocks. Section 4 gives information about the
data and contains the empirical results. It also argues the policy implications
of empirical results. Section 5 concludes with a summary.
2. Background
The movements in the exchange rate in monetary policy rules are discussed in
the theoretical and empirical literature. Ball (1999, 2002) argues for the role of
exchange rate in ination targeting frameworks for closed and open economies.
He found that pure ination targeting without considering the exchange rate is
dangerous, because it causes large uctuations in output. The e¤ect of exchange
rates on ination through import prices is the fastest channel and so ination
targeting implies that it is used aggressively. However, large shifts in the ex-
change rate create oscillations in output. Ball found that, holding the standard
deviation of output relative to potential output constant (at 1.4 per cent), the
interest-rate rule that reacts to the exchange rate as well as to output and in-
ation reduces the standard deviation of the ination rate around the ination
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target from 2.0 per cent to 1.9 per cent (Ball, 1999 p. 134) compared with a
rule that reacts only to ination and output. But this improvement is small.
He suggests that policy rules in open economies should be modied to include
information about the exchange rate. He uses a policy instrument - namely
Monetary Condition Index (MCI), a weighted average of the interest rate and
the exchange rate. Central banks should choose long-run ination targeting":
a measure of ination adjusted to lter out the e¤ects of exchange rate.
Taylor (2001) examines the exchange rate as a candidate for a monetary
policy rule for the ECB in the form suggested in Balls (1999) studies. He
argues that a monetary policy rule which responds directly to the exchange
rate, as well as to ination and output, sometimes works worse than policy
rules without reference to the exchange rate. In his -2002 study-, however,
Taylor indicates that monetary policy in open economies is di¤erent from the
policy in closed economies. Central banks seem averse to signicant variability
in exchange rates. They should target a measure of ination that removes the
transitory e¤ects of exchange rate uctuations as Ball (2002) suggests and they
should also contain the exchange rate in their policy rules.
On the other hand, the results of empirical studies focusing on policy rules
with exchange rates are quite controversial with theoretical studies mentioned
above. Clarida et al. (1998) show that monetary policy responds to the ex-
change rate in industrial countries, but the magnitude of the monetary policy
reaction is small. Along the same lines, Osawa (2006) estimates monetary policy
reaction functions to examine whether monetary policy responds to uctuations
in the exchange rate under the ination-targeting regimes in Korea, Thailand
and the Philippines using two stage least squares and ordinary least squares
(OLS). He nds no evidence that monetary policy reacts to the exchange rate.
Inclusion of the Asian nancial crisis period overestimates the monetary policy
reaction because exchange rate and interest rate are uctuated widely during
the crisis period. For the same countries, Sek (2008) apply a GMM and struc-
tural VAR to investigate the relationship between exchange rates and monetary
policy. The results of these approaches are consistent with each other, i.e. the
monetary policy reactions in Philippines and Korea do not response signicantly
to exchange rate directly. But they only nd a strong reaction of policy in Thai-
land to exchange rate uctuations in the pre-crisis period. The results in these
empirical papers are in accord with the results in Ball (1999) and Taylor (2001).
On the other hand, Filosa (2001) nds that many central banks in emerging
countries react strongly to exchange rate movements, although changes in the
monetary policy regime make it di¢ cult to assess the relative importance placed
by countries on ination control and external equilibrium. Mohanty and Klau
(2005) also nd a strong response of monetary policy to exchange rates for
Asian countries by focusing on quarterly data between 1995 and 2002. Lastly,
Frömmel and Schobert (2006) estimate a Taylor rule for six European countries.
They point out that the exchange rate plays an important role in the monetary
policy during the xed exchange rate regimes periods. However, this impact
disappears after the introduction of exible regimes.
Most of the empirical studies in the literature do not address the endogeneity
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problem and the numerous factors a¤ecting interest rates and exchange rates
simultaneously. Therefore, they cannot appropriately separate out the response
of monetary policy to the exchange rate. This paper aims to come up with
unbiased estimates with the heteroskedasticity based identication approach.
3. Statement of the Problem and Methodology2
In this paper, in order to overcome endogeneity between exchange rates and
interest rates, we use an identication method suggested by Rigobon (2003a).
This method relies on the heteroskedasticity in interest rates and exchange rates
to identify the monetary policy reaction to the exchange rate. Shifts in impor-
tance of exchange rate shocks relative to monetary policy shocks change the
covariance between the exchange rate and policy rate. It allows us to identify
the interest rate reaction to uctuations in exchange rate based on changes in
covariance.
The data suggest that shifts in the variance of shocks a¤ect the correlation
between changes in interest rates and exchange rates. Figure 1 shows the cor-
relation between daily changes in the exchange rate and daily changes in the
short-term interest rate. Note that the correlation varies but mostly becomes
negative during periods in which the volatility of exchange rates increased.
Figure 1: Comovements in Exchange Rate and Interest Rates
2The equations used in this section are inspired by RS (2003b).
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A VAR model, which includes unobserved shocks that a¤ect the interest
rate and exchange rate, is conducted as in RS (2003b). The dynamic structural
equations for the short-term interest rate and the exchange rate are written as
follows:
it = et + xt + zt + "t (1)
et = it + xt + zt + t (2)
where it is the short-term interest rate, et is the exchange rate and zt is
the unobserved variables.3 The variable xt captures observable shocks and zt
summarizes some unobserved shocks a¤ecting the exchange rate and the inter-
est rate such as changes in risk preference and liquidity shocks. Equation (1)
is the high frequency monetary policy reaction function for ECB.4 Equation
(2) represents the exchange rate equation, which measures the response of the
exchange rate to the interest rate and other shocks. "t is the monetary policy
shock, and t is the exchange rate shock. The residuals "t, t and unobserved
shock zt are assumed to be serially uncorrelated and to be uncorrelated with
each other.
Equations (1) and (2) cannot be estimated directly, because of the endo-
geneity between it and et and because of unobservable variable zt. Only the
following reduced form of equations (1) and (2) can be estimated:
it
et

= xt +

it
et

(3)
where the reduced form residuals are given by
it =
1
1   [( + ) zt + t + "t] (4)
et =
1
1   [(1 + ) zt + t + "t] (5)
The covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals is

 = E

[itet]
0
[itet]


 =
1
(1  )2
"
( + )
2
2z + 
22 + 
2
" (1 + ) ( + )
2
z + 
2
 + 
2
"
: (1 + )
2
2z + 
2
 + 
22"
#
(6)
3The coe¢ cient on zt in the exchange rate equation normalized to 1.
4When xt contains ination and output gap as observable variables, Equation (1) would
be a sort of modied Taylor rule.
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The covariance matrix only provides three moments-two variances and a
covariance while in matrix 
 but there are six unknown: , , , 2z, 
2
 and
2". Hence, these restrictions are not enough to achieve identication and recover
the structural form parameters. Heteroskedasticity in the reduced form residuals
provides additional restrictions to the system represented by (5). A shift to a
regime with a di¤erent covariance matrix provides three new equations and the
new regime also adds three unknown parameters 2z, 
2
 and 
2
".
Within this framework, assuming the monetary policy shocks "t are ho-
moscedastic ensure an identication. As is well known, the general character-
istic of macroeconomic data is heteroskedastic and monetary policy shocks are
heteroskedastic as well. Since our subsample stands for the non-policy dates
(days immediately preceding the monetary policy committee meeting days), we
assume that monetary policy shocks "t are homoscedastic across regimes. The
assumption of constant monetary policy shocks is not very restrictive, because
of the fact that the variance of the interest rate consists of varying 2 and
2z. This implies it is not homoscedastic and it is based on varying unobserved
shocks and exchange rate shocks through di¤erent regimes.
Under the assumption of homoscedastic policy shocks, a shift in the covari-
ance matrix provides three new equations but only two new unknown parame-
ters. Moreover, we assume ,  and  are stable across the covariance regimes.5
Under these assumptions at least three di¤erent regimes for the covariance ma-
trix are required to identify that the parameter of interest is , the reaction of
the short-term rate to the exchange rate. In the case of three regimes there are
nine equations and ten unknown parameters, and it is enough only for partial
identication. For each new regime indexed by the subscript i = 1; 2; 3, the
covariance matrix can be written as

i =
1
(1  )2
"
( + )
2
2i;z + 
22i; + 
2
" (1 + ) ( + )
2
i;z + 
2
i; + 
2
"
: (1 + )
2
2i;z + 
2
i; + 
22"
#
(7)
The parameter  must solve the following system of equations (see the ap-
pendix for the full solution):
 =

21;12  
21;22

21;11  
21;12 (8)
 =

31;12  
31;22

31;11  
31;12 (9)
5 In the macroeconomics literature, VARs are often estimated across samples that surely
exhibit heteroskedasticity, without allowing shifts in parameters. Similarly, in the nance
literature, many studies that even explicitly allow for variation in volatility, including GARCH
models, often require that the parameters of the underlying equation are xed (Rigobon, 2004).
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where 
j1 = 
j   
1 is the change in the covariance matrix from
regime j to regime 1 for j = 2; 3. 
j1;kl is the k and l element in matrix j.
When there are more than three regimes for the variance-covariance matrix,
any three can be used to arrive at a solution to equations (8) and (9). If the
model is correctly specied, the estimates of  should be the same for any three
regimes. We implement the standard test of the overidentifying restrictions
of the model. A rejection of the overidentifying restrictions test implies that
the homoscedastic policy shocks is violated or the parameters of equations are
not stable across the regimes. Also, if the parameter  is not constant the
formulation of RS (2003) may not capture the nonlinearity.
4. Data and Empirical Evidence
4.1 Data
In this study we use Germanys three-month Treasury bill rate as the short-
term interest rate and euro-dollar exchange rate. Treasury bill rates (T-Bill)
are not available for the European Central Bank. Therefore, we use the three-
month T-Bill of Deutsche Bundesbank as the short-term interest rate. One
could argue that instead of the T-Bill, ECB interest rate on the main renanc-
ing operations (MROs), or the Euro overnight index average (EONIA) would
be more appropriate instruments for the short-term interest rate. A graph is
plotted to show the relationship between three-month T-Bill rate of Germany,
EONIA and MROs for 1999:1-2010:09 period. As shown in Figure 2, the rates
are very closely related and move together. Furthermore, descriptive statistics
and correlations are calculated and reported in Table 1. The average of the
MROs is slightly higher but less volatile than that of T-Bill and EONIA. The
correlation between the T-Bill rate and MROs is approximately 0.97 while it be-
came 0.99 in the pre-crisis period. The correlation between EONIA and MROs
is also strong (0.99). A visual description and the results of correlations make
it readily possible to verify that T-Bill rates may be used as a proxy for ECB
policy action.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
EONIA MROs T-Bill
Mean 2.77 2.80 2.67
Median 2.79 2.75 2.71
Maximum 5.06 4.75 5.21
Minimum 0.34 1.00 0.13
Std. Dev. 1.25 1.09 1.28
Correlation EONIA MROs T-Bill
EONIA 1.00 - -
MROs 0.99* 1.00 -
T-Bill 0.98* 0.97* 1.00
*indicates signicance at the 1 per cent level.
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Figure 2: T-Bill rate, EONIA and MROs.
T-Bill is one of the most liquid securities at short maturities and it adjusts
daily according to changes in expectation of monetary policy over the following
term, whilst MROs are adjusted approximately once a month.6 The reason
to use T-Bill rate instead of EONIA is that volatility in interest rates is an
important factor for our identication approach and the a relatively poor way
to dene heteroskedasticity of the shocks.
Our empirical investigation relies on daily and monthly data covering the
period from April 1999 to September 2010. The daily data are used for the fol-
lowing reasons. Firstly, the daily data allows us to dene the heteroskedasticity
of the shocks more accurately. Secondly, the liquidity in the money market rate
can be a¤ected by central banks on a daily basis. Lastly, T-Bills tend to antici-
pate monetary policy decisions; monetary policy can a¤ect the daily movements
of T-Bills even if policy rate decisions take place less often (Bohl et al., 2007).
In this framework, we assume that monetary policy shocks are homoscedas-
tic. Therefore, the related sample stands for the non-policy dates (days immedi-
ately preceding the monetary policy committee meeting days) and the holidays
and weekends are removed. Euro-dollar exchange rates were obtained from the
ECB website and Bundesbank sta¤ provided the T-Bill rates.
The data are plotted in levels in Figures 3. As can be seen in the graph,
there is a negative relationship between the short term interest rate and the
exchange rate.
6Decisions on the euro area policy rates are taken during meetings of the Governing Council.
35 policy decisions were taken between 1999:01-2010:09.
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Figure 3: T-Bill rate and Exchange rate
4.2 Estimates for widely used methodologies
Formally, the dynamics of the short-term interest rates and the exchange
rate are written as follows:
it = et + 'xt + "t (10)
et = it + xt + t (11)
where it is the T-Bill rate, et is the change exchange rate, "t is the monetary
policy shock, and t is the exchange rate shock. As Rigobon and Sack (2003b)
point out, control for observable macroeconomic shocks is required. We add
lags in the exchange rate as an exogenous variable, as wells as lags in the short
term interest rate. The variable xt is a vector containing 5 lags of the exchange
rate and the interest rate.
As mentioned before, due to the endogeneity problem equations (8) and (9)
cannot be estimated and only reduced form of these equations can be estimated.
We are interested in the impact of changes in the exchange rate on the short
term interest rate. ECB policy reaction function can be estimated under inap-
propriate assumption of no simultaneous response of the exchange rate to the
interest rate. The estimated results of the policy reaction function (equation
10) are summarized in Table 2.
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Table 2: Response of Daily Changes in Short-Term Interest Rate to Changes in
Exchange Rate (Ignoring Endogeneity)
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Error t-Statistic
Exchange Rate -0.13 0.08 -1.50
Sample: 1999 to 2010 Included obs.: 2907
R-Squared: 0.20 Durbin-Watson stat.: 2.00
S.D. dependent var.: 0.036 S.E. of regression: 0.36
Regression includes a constant and ve lags of the interest rate and exchange rate.
The data are daily, and the sample runs from January 1999 to October 2010.
The changes in the exchange rate do not have a large impact on the inter-
est rate. The estimated coe¢ cient () is insignicant and negative, which is
consistent with ECB not being explicit about responding to a change in the
exchange rate. In that case ignoring the endogeneity, heteroskedasticity and
unobservability of common shock problems causes a strong biased estimated
policy reaction.
In order to describe the movements in interest rates, a large literature has
developed on estimating monetary policy rules. Monetary policy can be de-
scribed by a rule based on contemporaneous ination, output gap and lagged
interest rate as follows:
it = (1  )
 
0 + yyt + t

+ it 1 (12)
where t is the ination rate, yt is the output gap, and it is the policy rate.
Consumer price ination in the euro area is measured by the Harmonised Index
of Consumer Prices (HICP). In line with e.g. Clarida et al. (1998), we take the
industrial production index for the euro area and calculate the deviation of log
output from its Hodrick-Prescott lter trend in order to identify the output gap.
Table 2 shows the estimated parameters from this rule. This table indicates
that the ECB does not respond to the variations in ination, but responds
signicantly to the output gap. Because the exchange rate impacts on the path
of output and ination as discussed before, the rule needs to be modied to
include information about the exchange rate. Suppose that exchange rate, et,
has been taken into account in formulating monetary policy as in:
it = 0 + yyt + t + eet + it 1 (13)
where 0 = (1 )0, y = (1 )y,  = (1 ) and e = (1 )e. An
estimate of the equation (13) using OLS indicates that the measured reaction
of the interest rate to the variation in exchange rate is signicant, and increases
the output gap coe¢ cient very slightly.
The empirical literature has adopted instrumental variables or VAR ap-
proaches to address the endogeneity problem arising from the contemporaneous
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regressors. Following Gerlach and Smets (2000), we use current ination, cur-
rent output gap, the lag of policy rates and exchange rates as instruments.
The results in Table 3 show that the policy response to the exchange rate is
positive but not signicantly from zero. The results of IV estimation are sen-
sitive to the choice of instrumental variables, and it is hard to nd a suitable
instrument which a¤ects the exchange rate without a¤ecting interest rates. RS
(2003b) claims that using this sort of weak instruments leads to biased esti-
mates. Lastly, we apply structural VAR method to estimate a simultaneous
four equations system using the output gap, ination, the exchange rate and
the policy rate. The structural VAR system is expressed as:
AXT =  XT 1 + ut (14)
where X
0
t = [yt; t; et; it] is stationary and structural error ut~i:i:d N(0; D).
Unfortunately this equation system cannot be estimated directly due to the
identication issue. Additional information is required to identify the structural
parameters and shocks. We impose restrictions on contemporaneous the matrix,
A, following Cholesky decomposition and set matrix D as diagonal. Matrix A
becomes lower triangular and the system becomes just identied.7 The estimate
results are presented in the last column of Table 3. The results are essentially
same as the instrumental variable estimation results. The response of the policy
rate to the exchange rate is positive and insignicant.
Table 3: Monetary Policy Rule
Coe¢ cient Without
Exchange
Rate (OLS)
Including
Exchange
Rate (OLS)
Including
Exchange
Rate (IV)
Including
Exchange
Rate (SVAR)
0 0.60 (0.20) 0.60 (0.20) 0.56 (0.23) 0.14 (0.07)
y 0.09 (0.02) 0.10 (0.03) 0.09 (0.02) 0.05 (0.01)
 -0.14 (0.09) -0.14 (0.09) -0.12 (0.11) 0.07 (0.04)
e - 0.45 (1.15) 1.17 (1.22) 0.41 (0.36)
 0.86 (0.05) 0.86 (0.05)
Standard errors shown in parenthesis.
The problem with Cholesky decomposition is that a triangular matrix A
does not allow the contemporaneous relationship between exchange rate and
interest rate. Traditional identication assumptions are used in the applied
macroeconomics literature but are not appropriate in this context, because im-
posing restriction in one direction but not in the other is not realistic.8 Obvious
long-run restrictions are not available to di¤erentiate monetary policy shocks
from exchange rate shocks.
7Cholesky decomposition assumes that shocks are propogated in the order of output gap,
ination, exchange rate and interest rate. In this ordering yt is only a¤ected by its own shock;
t is a¤ected contemporaneously by its own shocks and yt shocks; et is a¤ected by its own
shocks, yt, t shocks; it is a¤ected by its own shocks and three other shocks.
8Short-run restrictions, long-run and sign restrictions are used in the literature to identify
the VAR models.
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Overall, applying commonly-used identication techniques or instrumental
variables cannot e¤ectively solve the endogeneity between interest rate and ex-
change rate or the omitted variable bias problem, as discussed before. In this
paper, we use a relatively new methodology based on the heteroskedasticity of
the error terms to identify the policy rate response to the exchange rate.
4.3 Identication through heteroskedasticity estimates
The initial step is determining the di¤erent regimes for the variance-covariance
matrix of the reduced form shocks to monetary policy and the exchange rate.
Firstly, equation (3) is estimated by VAR and computes the residuals. We de-
ne four regimes: one is that both interest rates and exchange rates shocks
have high volatility, one is that both shocks have low volatility, and in the other
two regimes in which one has low and the other high volatility. Periods of high
volatility are dened as when the thirty-day rolling variance of the residual from
VAR is more than one standard deviation above its average as identied in RS
(2003b). The four variance-covariance regimes are illustrated in Table 4.
Table 4: Variance-Covariance Matrix of Regimes
Variance of Monetary
Policy
Variance of Exchange
Rate
Covariance
Daily data
Regime 1 0.001209 0.000123 -0.000007
Regime 2 0.000082 0.000014 0.000001
Regime 3 0.002276 0.000066 -0.000067
Regime 4 0.010113 0.000053 0.000161
Monthly data
Regime 1 0.002135 0.000087 -0.000088
Regime 2 0.000488 0.000017 0.000009
Regime 3 0.002171 0.000074 -0.000106
Regime 4 0.007657 0.000043 0.000024
High variance regimes are in bold.
Table 3 reveals that the covariance between the interest rate and exchange
rate varies with shifts in their variances and it becomes negative when the volatil-
ity of exchange rate rises. These di¤erent regimes of the variance-covariance
matrix are chosen arbitrarily. As described in previous sections, the mone-
tary policy reaction to the exchange rate could be identied with at least three
regimes. I treat equations (8) and (9) as moment conditions and solve for the
parameters using GMM. Estimates of the monetary policy reaction coe¢ cient
 for daily and monthly data are listed in Table 5.
13
Table 5: Estimates of ECBs Reaction to Exchange Rate Under Alternative Regimes
Daily Data Regimes 1, 2, 3 Regimes 1, 2, 4 Regimes 1, 3, 4 Regimes 2, 3, 4
Coe¢ cient -0.19999 -0.27327 -0.27117 -0.15588
Std. deviation 0.00901 0.00615 0.02328 0.01639
Monthly Data Regimes 1, 2, 3 Regimes 1, 2, 4 Regimes 1,3, 4 Regimes 2, 3, 4
Coe¢ cient -0.32621 -0.29742 -0.51676 -0.28575
Std. deviation 0.00014 0.00113 0.02471 0.00007
For the daily time series the results indicate a negative policy response to the
exchange rate, with an estimated coe¢ cient  of -0.199. By employing a more
appropriate identication approach based on heteroskedasticity, a signicant
negative reaction of monetary policy to the exchange rate is found. This is
the major result of the paper. The point estimate for the response coe¢ cient 
shows that a 1 point rise in the exchange rate tends to decrease the three-month
interest rate by around 20 basis points. Similar results are obtained when the
other regimes are used to estimate the parameter. The estimates of monetary
policy reactions resulting from other regimes are consistently low and close to
one another.
In order to test whether the policy reaction to the exchange rate depends on
the frequency of the data, we estimate the same system using lower frequency
data. The results for monthly data, shown in Table 4, indicate that the esti-
mated response of monetary policy is negative and larger than high frequency
data. In addition, we consider a case of random 3-month rolling regimes instead
of the thirty-day rolling regimes and the results are largely similar. Even so, the
resulting estimates for low frequency and di¤erent identication regimes are still
small in magnitude and support the hypothesis that the ECB does not react to
exchange rate movements too much.
There are four regimes and only three regimes are su¢ cient for identication,
so the parameter is overidentied. Therefore, we also test whether the  para-
meter is stable across di¤erent regimes and the homoscedasticity assumption of
the policy shocks is valid. The result of the overidentication test shows that
all assumptions of the heteroscedasticity based identication approach are valid.
The hypothesis of parameter constancy cannot be rejected for both daily and
monthly time series except in two cases (i.e. estimates under regimes 1, 3, 4 for
daily data and regimes 1, 2, 4 for monthly data).9
9Many di¤erent overidentication tests could be performed and I have applied the GMM-
overidentication test. The overidentifying restrictions are tested with the following test
statistic: q^ = m()
0
V  1 m() where V  1 is the variance of the di¤erence of the estimators.
Note, however, that this approach does not test the assumption that the three shocks are un-
correlated. For a general treatment, see Harris and Matyas (1999) and Newey and McFadden
(1994).
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There is a big debate among economists about the role of asset prices in the
conduct of monetary policy. Cecchetti et al. (2000) nd strong support for in-
cluding stock prices in the central banks policy rule. They argue that reacting
to asset prices will allow central banks to stabilize ination and output more
successfully. In contrast Bernanke and Gertler (2001) claim that central banks
should not react asset prices, except insofar as they a¤ect the expected ination.
In this regard Jean-Claude Trichet said that " it is clearly not opportune to in-
troduce asset prices into a monetary policy rule the central bank should commit
to or in the central banks reaction function." at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago conference in 2002.10 According to him, a wide range of economic and
nancial indicators (stock prices, housing prices, exchange rates) are also ana-
lyzed in depth and their assessment is made in the context of maintaining price
stability over the medium term. The ECB does not react to their signals unless
price stability is endangered. Trichet summarized that if monetary policy does
not react directly to asset price developments, it clearly has to take into consid-
eration all the consequences of these developments on the aggregate economy
and expectations, since they may at some point a¤ect price developments.
In line with this debate the empirical exercises of this paper are intended only
to measure the policy response to the exchange rate. We are not primarily
concerned with determining whether such a reaction is optimal. We nd a sig-
nicant, negative and small response of the policy reaction coe¢ cient, although
the primary objective of ECB is price stability and it is not explicit about
responding to the exchange rate. But because the estimated policy reaction co-
e¢ cient is within reasonable distance from the magnitude, it appears that the
ECB responds to exchange rate movements only to o¤set the expected passing-
through of exchange rate shocks to ination and output. The empirical evidence
of this paper supports the ECB should monitor uctuations in exchange rate
rather than targeting.
5. Conclusion
Relatively little empirical evidence is available that estimates the impact of
exchange rates on the conduct of monetary policy. Estimating the response of
monetary policy to changes in the exchange rate is complicated by the endogene-
ity problem and the fact that both interest rates and the exchange rate react
to many other variables. This paper provides new empirical ndings on the
impact of exchange rate movements on interest rates using daily and monthly
data from the ECB between 1999-2010.
Using the method of identication through heteroskedasticity developed by
Rigobon (2003a), the reaction of policy to the exchange rate can be measured
e¤ectively when there are shifts in the variance of exchange rate shocks. This
methodology takes into account the simultaneous response of both the interest
rate and exchange rate to each other and common factors a¤ecting both variables
which widely used approaches in the literature might not address.
10The full speech of Jean-Claude Trichet, governor of ECB from 2003 to 2011, is available
at http://www.bis.org/review/r020426a.pdf
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The empirical results indicate that monetary policy reacts signicantly to
changes in the exchange rate, with a 1 point rise (fall) in the exchange rate
increasing the interest rate by 20 basis points. For daily and monthly time
series, the exchange rate has a negative but small impact on the interest rate of
ECB between 1999-2010. Such a signicant but small policy reaction coe¢ cient
implies that ECB consider the uctuations in exchange rate but not target
them. This is consistent with the suggestion that central banks may respond
to the movements in asset prices only to the extent that they impact on the
macroeconomy, since the exchange rate a¤ects the expected ination and output
path as Taylor (2001) suggests.
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Appendix. Details on methodology
In the present appendix, we provide the solution to the identication problem
mention in Section 3 and show how parameter  solves the system when at least
three di¤erent regimes are given.
Dene 
21 = 
2  
1 and 
31 = 
3  
1: Equation (7) implies
that

j1 =
1
(1 )2
"
( + )
2
2j1;z + 
22j1; (1 + ) ( + )
2
j1;z + 
2
j1;
: (1 + )
2
2j1;z +
2
j1;
#
where 2j1;z = 
2
j;z  21;z and 2j1; = 2j;  21; for j = f2; 3g.
Since the 2" is homoscedastic and ,  and  parameters are stable, the change
in covariance matrix does not depend on the variance of monetary policy shocks.
These two changes in the covariance matrices, 
21 and 
31, form a system of
six nonlinear equations with seven unknowns, but in which  is just identied.
To see this, rewrite the covariance matrix as:

j1 =
1
(1 )2

!z;j + 
22j1; !z;2 + 
2
j1;
: 2!z;2 +
2
j1;

 =
1 + 
 + 
!z;j = ( + )
2
2j1;z:
The six equations that result can be written as follows:
!z;2 + 
2221; = (1  )2 :
21;11
!z;2 + 
2
21; = (1  )2 :
21;12
2!z;2 +
2
21; = (1  )2 :
21;22
!z;3 + 
2231; = (1  )2 :
31;11
!z;3 + 
2
31; = (1  )2 :
31;12
2!z;3 +
2
31; = (1  )2 :
31;22
where 
j1;kl is the k and l element of the j matrix. If  6= 1 , which
assures nite variance, then the three equations for each covariance matrix col-
lapse to
 =

21;12  
21;22

21;11  
21;12
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 =

31;12  
31;22

31;11  
31;12
which is a system of two equations with two unknowns (,). Solving this
system of equation (8) and (9), the parameter of interest , and estimate for
combining  are obtained. RS (2003) selection criteria which is also applied in
this study is as follows: if the two roots have di¤erent signs, they select the
positive one. If they have the same sign, they choose the smaller in absolute
value. Substitute the equation (8) in (9) the below quadratic equation obtained
in terms of 
a2 + b + c = 0
where
a = 
31;22
21;12  
21;22
31;12
b = 
31;22
21;11  
21;22
31;11
c = 
31;12
21;11  
21;12
31;11:
The quadratic equation has a real solution and after some algebra it can be
written as follows:
(1 + )d2   (2 +  + )d + ( + )d
where
d = 2z;3
2
;2   2z;32;1   2z;12;2   2z;22;3 + 2z;12;3 + 2z;2
On condition that d 6= 0, the equation has two solutions:
1 = 
2 =
 + 
 + 1
=
1

Hence, we are able to estimate consistently  as long as we choose the
right solution of the quadratic form and we have at least three regimes for
the covariance matrix.
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